Abstract-In classical cooperative game theory one of the most important principle is defined by Shapley with three axioms common payoff fair distribution's Shapley value (or Shapley vector). In the last decade the field of its usage has been spread widely. At this period of time Shapley value is used in network and social systems. Naturally, the question is if it is possible to use Shapley's classical axiomatics for lexicographic cooperative games. 
I. INTRODUCTION
Analogically to the classical cooperative game theory in lexicographic cooperative games the main basic model represents a lexicographic noncooperative game [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6] . The players' cooperative behaviors in condition of a noncooperative game are studied. In noncooperative games players independently and simultaneously choose their strategies without telling each other about it. These games are called noncooperative where the players get guaranteed payoffs (utilities). In cooperative games the players can enrol in coalitions and each member can discuss about choosing their strategies consistently. At the same time the players from coalition sum their payoffs and then they distribute them. For a certain class of cooperative games players' utilities have a transferring feature. Payoffs are measured by the same scale and they can transfer from one player to another without loosing and limitation.
Let discuss a classical noncooperative game : 
We mean that for two ) ,..., 
In the process of transferring from ) ,..., (
game to the lexicographic cooperative game there are some difficulties they are analyzed by the author and it is related to the characterising function and the existence of the payoffs distribution, C -core and NeumannMorgenstern's solutions [7, 8] .
The article is dedicated to Shapley's axiomatic approach for lexicographic cooperative games [9] . It has been revealed that in contrast to the principles' of Ccore and Neumann-Morgenstern's solutions, Shapley's axiomatics principle is similar to the case of a classical one discussed by Shapley's axiomatics principle. In detail, axiomatics discussed by Shapley for classical games are sufficient with payoff's corresponding with distribution in lexicographic cooperative games. Besides, we are having a very interesting case -a classical principle identically is spread over the component of a lexicographic game for scalar games. (4) and for any 
The real vector-function 
As we have already stated above Shapley's axiomatics is defined for classical cooperative games and get the vector of payoff's distribution. 
II. RELATED WORK
Discussing this problem is very important and it is caused by several different circumstances. The problem is that Shapley's vector (value) and its result Shapley Shubik's index are discussed as the principle of a fair distribution. It is used in different branches of economics, in the market competitive conditions, in the distribution of input and stocks, logistics, network systems and etc.
How to make the individual get he reasonable and practical profit between the fourth party logistics is still a question for further researches. By using Shapley value the weight of each enterprise is analyzed [10] . It is shown that, Shapley value model is relatively rational, practical and necessary mechanism in the fourth party logistics. The development of cooperative strategies between exporting countries have been taken place by the logistic rationalization [11] . The annual gain's distribution is formulated by the concepts of a cooperative game theory. users and limited dispersion of information. However, most of today's networks are large scale with lack of access to centralized information, consist of users with diverse requirements, and are subject to dynamic changes. These factors naturally motivate a new distributed control paradigm, where the network infrastructure is kept simple and the network control functions are delegated to individual agents that make their decisions independently (-selfishly").The interaction of multiple independent decision-makers necessitates the use of game theory [12] . Network games represent the new direction in Game theory. Networked Control System (NCS) is a synthetic application that combines control science, computer science and network technology. Networked control systems (NCSs) have been gaining popularity with their high potential in widespread applications and becoming realizable with the rapid developments in computer, communication and control technologies. This paper reviews the development history of the NCS, and point out the field of farther researches [13] .
The Shapley value-probably the most important normative payoff division scheme in coalition games. This approach has a variety of real-world applications (including social and organisational networks, biological networks and communication networks), its computational properties have not been widely studied. To date, the only practicable approach to compute Shapley value-based centrality has been via Monte Carlo simulations that are computationally expensive and not guaranteed to give an exact answer. Against this background, this paper presents the first study of the computational aspects of the Shapley value for network centrality's [14] .
It is shown that if the distribution of profits is enforced at a global level, then there exist profit-sharing mechanisms derived from the coalition games concept of Shapley value and its extensions that will encourage these selfish ISPs who seek to maximize their own profits to converge to a Nash equilibrium [15] .
An easy and an efficient transmission pricing scheme using Shapley value method and power flow tracing method to allocate usage andcost of the transmission system in a deregulated environment is proposed. By comparing both the methods it is found that for a large power system allocation of usage and cost to users is difficult by using Shapley value method due to increase in number of coalitions [16] .
In the paper [17] a new centrality metric for social network is introduced. An appropriate cooperative game is proposed and then presented efficient approximate algorithm to compute Shapley value of this game in order to rank the nodes based on the gatekeeper centrality. Shapley Shubik's index is used in voting. It plays a great role in politics [18] . Namely, for the definition of polling station's measure, what station's support is more necessary for choosing the wanted candidate. In the Parliament or in other representative branch party's (player's) vote's number is not the accurate index of its influence. By means of Shapley's vector the index of player's is defined, as the average number of those coalitions, where its participation provides winning, and without it the coalition looses.
Hence, Game Theory as a branch of Mathematics and Computer Science. It helps us to solve the different problems of everyday life. The question is: why only mathematics helps us to solve the above stated problems. Because, the nature is innately mathematical and she speaks to us in mathematics. We should only listen to her. Therefore, any science that describes the nature is completely dependent on mathematics. Mathematics plays a great role and it is the essential instrument for many aspects of different sciences [19] .
At the same time Game Theory is one of the largest part of the information culture. Therefore it has a great influence on modern education. In the article [20] the influence of educational, professionalism and activity pecularites has been studied on the formation of the personal information culture pecularities.
There are many learning methodologies that have been adopted down the years. One of them is Problem Based Learning (PBL). PBL is an approach, in which the learners first encounter the problem, followed by a systematic, student-centered inquiry process. In general, games and simulations provide rich learning environment for the students [21] .
In game theory the most practical problems is multicriteria. All problems stated above is reasonable to establish in case of multi criteria. If we order these criteria with strict preference then in the interaction conditions we will have lexicographic cooperative games and Shapley matrix principle will be used. 
III. SHAPLEY'S AXIOMATICS FOR
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. ,..., 1 n i  Example 1. Let find Shapley's matrix for 2 dimensioned lexicographic cooperative game : ) , (
Therefore acoording to the theorem it has Shapley's matrix i Let name these coalition for every : i
After this we easily calculate (27) each summand.
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( scalar games any of them or every could not be super additive. The difference is in the case of a scalar cooperative game Shapley's axiomatics gives us the vector of payoffs' distribution, but in the case of a lexicographic cooperative game it is given by the form of a matrix. The given result -Shapley matrix principle could be used in all those problems, where Shapley vector is used, if the problem will be put by using ranking criteria.
